April 27, 2019

The Snowden files: where are they and where should they end up?

(Updated: October 31, 2023)

In March 2019, The Intercept shut down access to the Snowden documents both for internal and external research. But where are these files in the first place, and what should be their future destination? During a podcast interview, Snowden himself commented on this issue as well.



Screenshot from a Brazilian television report, showing some of the Snowden files
opened in a TrueCrypt window on the laptop of Glenn Greenwald.
(screenshot by koenrh - click to enlarge)



The Intercept

The Intercept is a website that was launched in February 2014 by Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Jeremy Scahill. It was the first digital magazine of First Look Media (FLM), a hybrid for-profit and non-profit media organization set up in October 2013 by eBay-founder Pierre Omidyar.

(Greenwald already came up with the idea for a dedicated website in June 2013 in case that The Guardian would not publish his first Snowden story)

The short-term mission of The Intercept was to "provide a platform and an editorial structure in which to aggressively report on the disclosures provided to us by our source, NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden."

For the long term, The Intercept wants to provide "aggressive and independent adversarial journalism across a wide range of issues, from secrecy, criminal and civil justice abuses and civil liberties violations to media conduct, societal inequality and all forms of financial and political corruption."


External research

For its short-term mission, The Intercept had a special team of several researchers to maintain and examine the Snowden files in a secure way. Initially, documents were only published alongside the articles written by Glenn Greenwald, Jeremy Scahill, Ryan Gallagher and other reporters.

In May 2016, The Intercept also began publishing NSA documents in bulk, starting with all editions of SIDtoday, the internal newsletter of the NSA's Signals Intelligence division, which are available from 2003 to 2012. So far, a total of 1861 editions have been published in seven batches. It's not clear whether this series will be completed.

Update: On May 29, 2019, The Intercept published an eighth and final batch consisting of 287 SIDtoday articles from late 2006, bringing the total to 2148 editions of this newsletter.

Also in may 2016, it was decided to "invite outside journalists, including from foreign media outlets, to work with us to explore the full Snowden archive", to begin with journalists from the French newspaper Le Monde:

"Le Monde worked directly, during several days, in collaboration with The Intercept, on the Edward Snowden archive given to Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras: tens of thousands of documents exfiltrated by the former agent from the NSA servers, and safely stored by The Intercept."

As a result of this collaboration, Le Monde published a series of six articles in December 2016, mainly about GCHQ spying operations against Israel and in Africa. It seems there have been no similar collaborations with other foreign journalists.


The decision

With its first mission apparently accomplished, The Intercept will now move forward with its long-term mission: "For five years, the company expended substantional resources to continue to report on the Snowden archive, but The Intercept has now decided to focus on other priorities" - according to First Look Media CEO Michael Bloom.

How this decision was made can be learnt from a reconstruction made by Barrett Brown, which includes a timeline written by Laura Poitras:

On Tuesday March 12, on a phone call with Glenn [Greenwald] and the CFO, I am told that Glenn and Betsy [Reed, editor-in-chief of The Intercept] had decided to shut down the archive because it was no longer of value to The Intercept. This is the first time I am heard about the decision. On the call, Glenn says we should not make this decision public because it would look bad for him and The Intercept. I objected to the decision. I am confident the decision to shut the archive was made to pave to fire/eliminate the research team.

The next day, March 13, Poitras sent an e-mail to Michael Bloom saying she was "sickened" and in a memo she called on the board to review the decision: "This decision and the way it was handled would be a disservice to our source, the risks we’ve all taken, and most importantly, to the public for whom Edward Snowden blew the whistle."

This e-mail was leaked to the news website The Daily Beast, which reported about it the same day. This was likely the way how Edward Snowden heard of it, as in the Motherboard podcast interview from April 22 he said that he learnt about The Intercept's decision from the news.

On March 14, Snowden was called by Laura Poitras: "He had not been informed by Glenn or Betsy about their decision to shut down the archive. I apologize to him."

Updates:

On October 29, 2020, Glenn Greenwald resigned from The Intercept, saying that his editors conducted political censorship by preventing him from reporting on allegations concerning Joe Biden's conduct with regard to China and Ukraine. Editor-in-chief Betsy Reed disputed this and accused Greenwald of presenting dubious claims by the Trump campaign as journalism.

On November 30, 2020, The Intercept fired Laura Poitras, according to her account because she criticized how the organization failed to protect Reality Winner, who provided The Intercept with an NSA document about Russian hacking operations. According to First Look Media, however, Poitras' contract wasn't renewed after she "decided to step away from her role at the company to pursue her own projects" and had "not been active in any capacity with our company for more than two years."


The reason

Given that firing The Intercept's research team saves only 1.5% of First Look Media's non-profit budget, some people suspected that there may be other reasons for shutting down the Snowden archive. Pierre Omidyar, for example, could have preferred to keep his good relations with the US government.

Michael Bloom however says that the remaining documents aren't interesing enough anymore, and points to the fact that other major media outlets "ceased reporting on it years ago. Many decided that the resources required to continue to work on the archive were not justified by the journalistic value the remaining documents provide, as those documents have aged."

In 2013, The Guardian, The Washington Post and Der Spiegel each had between 10 and 30 reports based upon the NSA files, but that number declined to just a few in 2015 and since 2016 it was basically only The Intercept that continued with new reports, but these were mainly background stories without significant revelations.



Office of First Look Media (FLM) in New York City
(photo: TheMuse.com)



Copies of the Snowden files

The actual number of documents that Snowden took away from the NSA is still unclear and disputed. According to the 2016 report from the US House Intelligence Committee, he removed more than 1.5 million documents from two classified intelligence networks: NSANet and JWICS.

(Strangely enough, the House Intelligence report says that JWICS stands for "Joint Warfighter Information Computer System" while the actual name of the network is Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System)

Glenn Greenwald said that the number of 1.5 million was "pure fabrication" and he could probably agree with former NSA director Keith Alexander who in November 2013 estimated that Snowden had exposed only between 50,000 and 200,000 documents.


Full copies of the files

As far as we know, complete sets of these documents are/were in the hands of:

- Glenn Greenwald (received from Snowden in Hong Kong)
- Laura Poitras (received from Snowden in Hong Kong)

Greenwald and Poitras agreed that no one other than they would ever have access to the full set of documents. And to "keep media organizations on a leash" they would only provide them with files and information on a story-by-story basis.

Four other people also received copies of the full archive, because on May 10, 2013, so more than a week before he left Hawaii, Snowden had sent backup copies of the NSA files in postal packages to four individuals:

- Jessica Bruder in New York, who had her package hidden by Dale Maharidge in North California
- Trevor Timm of the Freedom of the Press Foundation (of which Snowden became board member in 2014 and president in 2016)
- One person who wants to remain anonymous
- One unknown person

The existence of these packages, which was only revealed in May 2017, confirms the story from late June 2013 about a "doomsday cache" which Glenn Greenwald said was Snowden's Plan B.

According to Greenwald, the people holding the backup files "cannot access them yet because they are highly encrypted and they do not have the passwords." But "if anything happens at all to Edward Snowden, he told me he has arranged for them to get access to the full archives."

During a television interview shortly afterwards, Greenwald said that backup copies might also be somewhere out on the internet, but given Snowden's fear of putting sensitive things online that may have been a slip of the tongue, or deliberately deceiving.

Update:

According to Barton Gellman's book Dark Mirror, Snowden initially said that the idea of a cache of documents to be released in case he was killed was a "stupid revenge narrative" but after some pressure, he eventually said that he had "prepared an archive of additional documents in an encrypted container. He did not share the key with anyone. That container was filled with files that he had not had time to organize. They might be even more sensitive than the others." Snowden devised a system in which the decryption key was split and shared among Gellman, Greenwald and Poitras, so that only all three could open the dead man archive. But Snowden got doubts and in the end he did not activate the mechanism and destroyed the key for the extra container.*
Gellman's book doesn't mention the backup copies sent in postal packages.


There are also people who have not been in possession of any documents, but who were temporarily granted full access to the whole cache, like James Bamford, The Intercept's research team and some others.



Glenn Greenwald working with the Snowden files outside his house in Rio de Janeiro
(screenshot from a television report by Fantastico)


Partial copies of the files

Besides the complete sets of Snowden files, there are several parties that keep, or have kept partial copies:

- The Guardian (received from Snowden by Ewan MacAskill)
- ProPublica (received from The Guardian)
- The New York Times (received from The Guardian)
- The Washington Post (received from Snowden by Barton Gellman)
- Der Spiegel (received from Laura Poitras)*


Updates:

According to Barton Gellman's book Dark Mirror, Snowden provided him and Laura Poitras the keys to an encrypted archive of documents called "Pandora" on May 21, 2013. Pandora was encrypted in TrueCrypt format and contained another archive in TrueCrypt format called "Verax". Within Verax there was a third vault called "Journodrop" which was an encrypted, compressed archive in 7z format. Gellman says that the Pandora archive was 8 gigabytes and contained over 50,000 separate documents, all neatly organized in folders.*
Laura Poitras gave Glenn Greenwald a copy of the Pandora archive just before they boarded their flight to Hong Kong on June 1. There, Greenwald, Poitras and Ewan MacAskill received additional files from Snowden.*

According to Ewan MacAskill, Snowden gave him "a memory stick. I expected it to contain one or two examples; instead, it stored tens of thousands of documents, covering both the NSA and GCHQ. These were to form the basis for subsequent reporting by The Guardian, The New York Times, and ProPublica, which became partners in investigating and publishing the story."

In November 2023, MacAskill said that a copy of the documents provided to The Guardian is still locked in the New York Times office and that The Guardian still retains responsibility for them.

In 2016, after she had moved back to New York, Laura Poitras built a secure room to house the Snowden documents, according to security expert Bruce Schneier.

Being under threat from the British government, The Guardian rescued their set of documents by providing copies to The New York Times and the investigative journalism platform ProPublica, where they would be better protected under the First Amendment of the US constitution.

The Guardian's own set was eventually physically destroyed in front of GCHQ technicians on July 20, 2013:



Video showing the destruction of the laptop containing The Guardian's Snowden files


The German magazine Der Spiegel published a total of 89 documents from their share of the Snowden trove, including ones that were not disclosed as part of earlier reporting. A first set of 53 documents was released on June 18, 2014 and a second set of another 36 documents on January 17, 2015.

Besides the news outlets with their own partial copies, Greenwald and The Intercept also shared selected documents from the Snowden cache with teams of journalists of more than two dozen media outlets in as many different countries.


> It should be noticed that a range of highly classified NSA documents have been published which came from other sources than Edward Snowden; see: Leaked documents that were not attributed to Snowden.


Protection of the files

In order to protect the Snowden files, only brand new laptops with no connection to the internet are used to search, sort and read them. It's not clear whether the files themselves are also stored on these laptop computers, or only on removable storage devices, like a thumb drive or an SD card.

Update:

According to Barton Gellman's book Dark Mirror, the files he received from Snowden were stored on brand new laptops which had their usb-ports sealed, wi-fi and bluetooth hardware removed and the batteries disconnected. The data on these laptops were encrypted, with the keys stored on memory cards which were also encrypted and were never in the same room except when in use. The laptops were stored in a big and heavy safe bolted to the floor of a windowless room with a high-security lock and a video camera in the hall outside. The Snowden archive was thus protected by four different credentials: door key, safe combination, digital key card, and passphrases. These credentials were divided among the reporting team members and no one but Gellman had all of them.*


In a 2013 Brazilian television report, Glenn Greenwald was seen using some thumb drives and a standard SD card while working with the Snowden documents.

In another television report we could even see the screen of Greenwald's laptop with several of the BOUNDLESSINFORMANT documents being opened in a TrueCrypt window. TrueCrypt was a software application used to fully or partially encrypt hard drives and removables drives using the AES, Serpent and Twofish ciphers.

Data on the external hard drive that Greenwald's partner David Miranda was carrying when he was detained at Heathrow Airport in August 2013 was reportedly also encrypted with TrueCrypt.



Glenn Greenwald working with the Snowden files outside his house in Rio de Janeiro
(screenshot from a television report by Fantastico)
 


The future of the files

What can or should happen with the Snowden files? Wikileaks, Cryptome and many others demanded that all the documents should be released to the public. But Snowden did not want an indiscriminate dump like how Manning's files were eventually published on Wikileaks. Instead, he insisted on responsible disclosures by independent journalists.

Accordingly, Glenn Greenwald stressed that the NSA files should "be released in conjunction with careful reporting that puts the documents in context and makes them digestible to the public, and that the welfare and reputations of innocent people be safeguarded."

The reality has actually been somewhat different: in many cases, press reports lacked a proper context, were sensationalist or even misleading because of misinterpretations. And while protecting the reputations of individuals, that of the NSA seemed "fair game".


First Look Media's CEO Michael Bloom hoped "that Glenn and Laura are able to find a new partner - such as an academic institution or research facility - that will continue to report on and publish the documents in the archive consistent with the public interest" and Greenwald tweeted that he was already looking for "the right partner [...] that has the funds to robustly publish."

But money seems not the problem: if there's one place with enough money than it's First Look Media, which was funded by eBay billionaire Omidyar with some 87 million US Dollar between 2013 and 2017 (of which Greenwald earned more than 1.6 million USD from 2014 to 2017).


In the Motherboard interview, Snowden said that "what remains in the archive is stuff that requires much more substantial effort" which would be better for a book. He said that The Intercept wasn't meant for that and that it was up to academic institutions, but they didn't dare because they depend on grants from the federal government.

Snowden also argued that handing over the files to a foreign academic institute was also not an option because then the US government would come up with the accusation of providing classified information to foreigners.


But when it's so hard to find a well-funded institution for further research and responsible publications and the final option of deleting all the files comes closer, it's also not unthinkable that someone will try to "rescue" the archive by putting everything online. After all, there have been other disclosures that were not in accordance with Snowden's intentions.


Updates:

In an "ask me anything" on Reddit from July 2020, Barton Gellman said that he stopped reporting when he "judged that the remaining documents were merely technical or bureaucratic or incremental versions of things of things I had already written -- or discussed information that I did not think should be public. (Names and photos of operational personnel; names, places and fruits of specific operations against obvious adversaries; etc.) The material is now in cold storage, as secure and inaccessible as I could devise."

According to footnote 17 on page 63 of Jacob Appelbaum's PhD thesis (very large .pdf) from March 2022, the Snowden archive of The Intercept has reportedly been destroyed. In June 2023, Appelbaum added that it was an insider who told him that The Intercept had destroyed its copy of the Snowden archive and that the company withheld many things that are in public interest.

> See also: Some new snippets from the Snowden documents




Links and sources

- Menschen Machen Medien: Snowden und die große Datenmisshandlung (2023)
- Spytalk: The Curious Fate of Citizen Snowden’s Archive (2022)
- Justice Integrity Project: Snowden archives at great risk — As alarming as Assange's arrest
- Barrett Brown: Why The Intercept Really Closed the Snowden Archive
- Tim Shorrock: Why Did Omidyar Shut Down The Intercept’s Snowden Archive? - Part 2 - Part 3
- Bruce Schneier: First Look Media Shutting Down Access to Snowden NSA Archives
- Columbia Journalism Review: The Intercept, a billionaire-funded public charity, cuts back
- The Daily Beast: The Intercept Shuts Down Access to Snowden Trove
- The Intercept: The Intercept is Broadening Access to the Snowden Archive. Here's why

March 25, 2019

The phones of former FBI Director Robert Mueller

(Updated: March 30, 2019)

Last Friday, March 22, special counsel Robert S. Mueller ended his investigation on possible Russian influence in the 2016 United States presidential elections.

Before he was appointed special counsel in May 2017, Mueller served 12 years as director of the FBI, from September 2001 to September 2013.

Here we take a look at the telecommunications equipment used by Robert Mueller when he was leading the FBI, based upon some rare photos of his office.



The office of former FBI director Robert S. Mueller, June 4, 2010.
(photo: Melina Mara/The Washington Post/Getty Images)


The FBI Director's office

The office of the Director of the FBI is on the seventh floor of the FBI headquarters, the brutalistic J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington D.C. Pictures of this room are very rare, but in 2010, The Washington Post provided some views of Robert Mueller in his office, which appeared to be rather small and with remarkably old-fashioned furniture.

Next to the director's office is a small executive conference room, also with 19th century furniture and a sign that looks as if it's from a Western movie, saying "Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation". On the wall there's large world map, where for a domestic security service like the FBI one would rather expect a map of the United States:



The conference room next to the director's office, June 4, 2010.
(photo: Melina Mara/The Washington Post/Getty Images - click to enlarge)



Telephone systems

In the photos we can see that in the office of FBI director Mueller there were four phones, which belong to three different telephone systems, two for secure and one for non-secure calls:





IST phone

The first phone from the left is a big white Integrated Services Telephone (IST), which was designed by Electrospace Systems Inc. (ESI) and manufactured by Raytheon. This is a so called "red phone", which means that it's connected to the Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN). This is the main secure telephone network for military command and control communications and connects all mayor US command centers and many other military facilities.

Although this IST phone looks very futuristic, it has already been replaced by the newer IST-2, which was introduced in 2003. The new IST-2 was also on the president's desk in the Oval Office, before it was replaced by a Cisco IP phone for the new Executive Voice over Secure IP-network, which provides a highly secured link between the President and his senior cabinet members.

It's interesting to see that there's no such new IP telephone in the office of the director of the FBI, which means that he has no direct line to the president - according to the fact that FBI falls under the Department of Justice and the director of the FBI reports to the Attorney General.




STE phone

Next to the IST there's a big black telephone called Secure Terminal Equipment (STE). It's made by the American defense contractor L-3 Communications (since 2016: L3 Technologies) and is capable of encrypting phone calls up to the level of Top Secret/SCI. There's also an STE phone at the small drawer chest in the director's conference room.

STE phones can be used to make encrypted calls to anyone with a similar or compatible device and there are an estimated 400.000 STE users. STE is the successor of the almost legendary STU-III secure phone system from the late 1980s.

These STE phones can be used for secure communications with everyone working for the US government, the military, its contractors, and also foreign partners who can not be reached through a more select secure telephone network, like the aforementioned DRSN.




Nortel M5216

Finally, there were two Nortel M5216 Meridian telephones in former director Mueller's office: one with two additional 22 button key expansion modules on the desk, and one without these modules on the standing desk alongside the wall. These phones were used for any non-secure calls inside and outside the FBI headquarters.

The M5216 telephone sets were manufactured by the former Canadian company Northern Telecom or Nortel and look rather outdated as they are probably from the mid-1990s. The Nortel telephone system itself is even older: it goes back to the SL-1 PBX from 1975, which was gradually enhanced and renamed Meridian-1 in the late 1980s.

The system provides advanced voice and data features for applications ranging from 60 to 16.000 lines and also has Centrex capability. It became the first fully digital PBX on the global market and it was one of the most widely used business telephone systems, with an estimated number of 43 million installed users worldwide.





Computer networks

Besides the four telephone sets, there's also a computer in the office of former FBI director Mueller, which can be seen right behind the ubiquitous Aeron office chair. A KVM-switch allows him to use a single set of Keyboard, Video and Mouse to access multiple FBI networks on different classification levels, like:

- Law Enforcement Online (LEO), which is a web-based system for sharing information among the law enforcement community that is running over the internet, classified For Official Use Only.

- Federal Bureau of Investigation Network (FBINet), which is the FBI's intranet and can only be accessed through an FBI computer.

- FBI Secret Network, which can be accessed from any US government computer that is connected to the Intelligence Community's INTELINK-S network that is running on the Defense Department's SIPRNet infrastructure, classified up to Secret.

- Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network (SCION), which is the FBI's designation of the Intelligence Community's INTELINK-TS network that is running on the Defense Department's JWICS infrastructure, classified up to Top Secret/SCI.




Former FBI director Mueller working in his office, June 4, 2010.
(photo: Melina Mara/The Washington Post/Getty Images - click to enlarge)



Links and sources
- The Washington Post: Federal government cancels costly, decade-long search for a new FBI headquarters (2017)
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence: IATCG Intelligence Guide (2011)


See also:
- The phones of US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
- NSA director Alexander's phones
- US State Department red phones
- Commander Petraeus' phones


November 28, 2018

A new secure phone for outside the White House



Last Thursday, Americans celebrated Thanksgiving and traditionally the president addressed members of the military services that are deployed abroad. For Donald Trump this was the second time during his presidency.

The video footage and photos of that address also showed something that is one of the topics of this weblog: a new telephone used for top level telecommunications of the president of the United States:



President Trump speaks to members of the military over the phone
from his Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach. November 22, 2018.
(photo: Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images - click to enlarge)


The telephone set that president Trump used for his conference call can be recognized as a Cisco IP Phone 8841, but with some distinctive modifications.


Top Secret

The first one is that is has a bright yellow bezel around the high-resolution color display, while standard phones have a black or a silver one. As yellow is the color code for information classified Top Secret/Sensitive Comparmented Information (TS/SCI), the bezel shows that this phone can be used for calls at the highest level.

This phone is part of the Executive Voice over Secure IP-network, which connects the US president with all major decision makers, like the secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland Security as well as the Director of National Intelligence. The phones themselves have no encryption capability - they are connected to a central network encryptor, probably from General Dynamics' TACLANE familiy.


Fiber network

The second modification is that the device can be directly connected to a local fiber optic network, instead of the usual connection to a copper cable telephone system through an RJ-14 plug. Because signals traveling over copper cables cause electromagnetic emanations ("TEMPEST"), they are easier to intercept than when there's a fiber optic network.

The new phone was modified by CIS Secure Computing, Inc., which is a small company that provides additional security functions for commercial-of-the-shelf communications equipment. On its website it advertises the Cisco 8841 Fiber Enabled VoIP Phone and in the photo below the company's logo can be recognized on the back side of the device:



President Trump with the new Cisco IP phone seen from the back side. November 22, 2018.
(photo: AP/Susan Walsh - click to enlarge)


It's not known when exactly this new telephone was installed, but it must have been somewhere after Trump's first Thanksgiving address last year. Then we still saw the old phone for highly secure calls. This was a common Cisco 7975 Unified IP phone, which was also modified by CIS Secure Computing, providing it with TEMPEST protection and two 1 Gigabit SC Fiber ports.




Left: the old Cisco 7975 IP Phones in 2017; right: the new Cisco IP Phone 8841 in 2018
(click to enlarge)


White House

In the Oval Office, the old Cisco 7975 for the classified network had already been replaced by a Cisco IP Phone from the new 8800-series by September 2017. However, this phone has no additional security functions (like a fiber optic connection or on-hook disconnection of the handset) nor the yellow bezel.



The Cisco 7975 IP phones for secure calls were introduced in 2007 as part of a general upgrade of the White House communications systems under president George W. Bush. Meanwhile this type of Cisco telephones is about 15 years old, so the replacement may not come as a surprise.

It seems that with the modified Cisco IP Phone 8841 all the old phone sets for secure and non-secure calls, used both inside and outside the White House, have now been replaced by new devices from Cisco's 8800-series.


October 9, 2018

The GRU close access operation against the OPCW in perspective

(Updated: December 2, 2018)

Last Thursday, October 4, the Dutch Ministry of Defence held a press conference about how its Military Intelligence and Security Service MIVD had disrupted a spying operation by the Russian military intelligence agency GRU last April.

Four Russian operatives were caught red-handed when they tried to hack into the Wi-Fi network of the headquarters of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague. Meanwhile, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) published a formal indictment against seven GRU officers, including the four from the Netherlands.

Here, the failed GRU operation will be compared to close access operations of the NSA, which learns us more about the methods for hacking wireless networks. There are also some answers to frequent questions about the disruption by the MIVD.



Press conference with from left to right: MIVD director Onno Eichelsheim, Defence
minister Ank Bijleveld, British ambassador Peter Wilson
(photo: Bart Maat/ANP - click to enlarge)


MIVD presentation

During the press conference, the director of MIVD, major general Onno Eichelsheim, explained the case using a 35-page powerpoint presentation with an unprecedented amount of photos and details of what had been discovered about the Russian operation.

This makes the presentation very similar to the ones from the Snowden-revelations, although they were highly classified and for internal use only, while the MIVD presentation is unclassified (in Dutch: ongerubriceerd) and, although marked as For Official Use Only, made for the general public.



Front slide of the MIVD presentation about the disrupted GRU close access operation
(click to download the full presentation)



Close Access operations

MIVD director Eichelsheim revealed that the GRU officers planned a "close access" operation. Such an operation can range from simply setting up a microphone to listen into what is said in a nearby building, to the highly sophisticated collection of unintentional emanations from computer equipment by exploiting so-called TEMPEST vulnarabilities.

In this case it was an effort to gain access to the internal Wi-Fi network of the OPCW headquarters building by using an interception system hidden in a car at a nearby parking lot. It was described as high-end equipment capable of hacking Wi-Fi connections from a distance, identifying the users and intercepting their login credentials.

This sounds very similar to an IMSI-catcher (also known as a Stingray), a very expensive device that functions like a fake cell tower. It's used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies either to identify the nearby active phone numbers, or to actually intercept the calls of a particular cell phone.



The equipment found in the car of the GRU officers, clarified by a diagram
(source: MIVD - click to enlarge)


WiFi Pineapple

Besides the equipment in the car, the backpack of GRU officer Serebriakov also contained some antennas, a WLAN Booster, a WiFi Signal Booster and a WiFi Pineapple model NANO. These Pineapples, with a cost of just around 100,- US Dollar, can mimic the functions of a Wi-Fi server. They are not only used by law enforcement and penetration testers, but are also popular among criminals who use them to spoof Wi-Fi networks so that victims connect to them rather than the intended legitimate server.

As explained in the DoJ indictment, it's likely that the GRU already tried to get access to the OPCW computer network through remote hacking methods, like spear fishing e-mails. Only after that failed to result in the desired access, the agency apparently decided to sent a team to break in through close access methods. Had they succeeded, then the hacking team back in Moscow would have taken over again to exploit the access through remote means.


NSA equivalent

The GRU officers clearly planned to hack the OPCW network and infect it, a technique that wasn't yet known to the MIVD, according to director Eichelsheim. The latter sounds intruiging, but wasn't explained any further.

For an indication of what that mysterious Russian method might be, we can look at the techniques used by the NSA to hack into WiFi networks, which are also referenced to as 802.11 networks. The Snowden-trove provided several documents about this, some of which were published in August 2016 by the website The Intercept.

The NSA equivalent of the set-up found in the car of the GRU officers seems to be a mobile antenna system running software codenamed BLINDDATE. This software can also be attached to a drone to be positioned within the range ofa wireless network of interest:



The NSA's BLINDDATE Wi-Fi hacking system, depicted in the field in Afghanistan
(click to enlarge)


One of the components of BLINDDATE is a "man-in-the-middle" attack method codenamed BADDECISION, which redirects the target's wireless web traffic to a FOXACID server of the NSA. Such a server is then able to infect the target's computer with various kinds of spying malware. This method even seems to work when the wireless connection is WPA or WPA2 encrypted.



Slide from an 2010 NSA presentation of the BADDECISION Wi-Fi hacking method
(click for the full presentation)


SCS units

Such close access operations for American intelligence are usually conducted by units of the Special Collection Service (SCS). They operate covertly from inside US diplomatic facilites around the world and consist of specialized officers from both CIA (for getting physical or HUMINT access) and NSA (for the SIGINT interception equipment).

Interestingly, the GRU team had a similar composition with Aleksei Morenets and Evgenii Serebriakov as cyber operators and Oleg Sotnikov and Alexey Minin for HUMINT support.



The GRU team arrives at Schiphol Airport on April 10, 2018. From left to right: Serebriakov
(cyber), Minin (HUMINT), Sotnikov (HUMINT), Morenets (cyber), Russian embassy official.
(source: MIVD presentation - click to enlarge)


Traveling team

According to the DoJ indictment, Serebriakov and Morenets are both members of Unit 26165, also known as the GRU 85 Main Special Service Center, traveling to foreign countries to conduct on-site hacking operations. Evidence for that was provided by Serebriakov's laptop, from which the MIVD recovered the earlier Wi-Fi connections.

It appeared that they had also been in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in August 2016 and in Lausanne, Switzerland in September 2016, where they targeted the anti-doping agencies WADA and USADA. In December 2017 the laptop connected to a Wi-Fi network in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which related to the Flight MH17 investigation. After the OPCW in The Hague, their next assignment should have been the Spiez chemical laboratory in Switzerland.

Note that Serebriakov and Morenets traveled to targets related to some of the most controversial issues of Russian politics, which indicates their importance for GRU operations.


Embassy facilities

The fact that the four men were flown in, indicates that the GRU doesn't have such a team permanently stationed inside the Russian embassy in The Hague - just like there's also no SCS unit within the American embassy, according to a 2010 slide from the NSA.

The SCS units became notorious after it was revealed that one of them had been assigned to eavesdrop on German chancellor Angela Merkel and subsequently SCS "spying sheds" were discovered on the rooftops of a number of US embassy buildings.

The Russian embassy in The Hague, which is not very far from both the prime minister's residence as well as from the OPCW building, doesn't have visible spying structures on its roof.



The Russian embassy in The Hague. About 1/3 of the diplomatic personnel can
be considered working for Russian intelligence agencies.
(photo: OmroepWest.nl - click to enlarge)


Update:

On November 30, 2018, the Dutch newspaper NRC came with a long piece about espionage by military officials from the Russian embassy in The Hague, a facility which includes six historic villas, a school, a tennis court and a range of satellite dishes, on a fenced area of ​​almost one hectare.

NRC journalists were able to identify several GRU employees working under diplomatic cover who were involved in various kinds of espionage activities. Most notable was Anton Naoemkin, who's official job at the embassy was Head of Protocol. He appeared to be the man who accompanied the GRU team at Schiphol airport as can be seen in one of the photos released in the MIVD presentation.

Naoemkin brought them to the embassy, where they were awaited by Konstantin Bachtin, who was also involved in the hacking attack, but who may also compromised the operation by constantly calling with Moscow - which may have been intercepted. NRC also mentioned that one month after the failed close access operation, the GRU conducted fishing mail attacks against the OPCW.


Questions

Referencing the "alibi" for the two Russians accused of poisoning Sergei Skripal, MIVD director Eichelsheim noted that the four GRU officers were clearly not on a holiday: they carried spying equipment, multiple cell and smartphones as well as 20.000,- US Dollar and the same amount of Euros in cash.

Also things like how Morenets tried to destroy a smartphone, several traces leading back to the GRU headquarters and the list of earlier Wi-Fi connections still stored on the laptop make the operation look sloppy and unprofessional. Actually it shows that the GRU didn't consider these kind of close access operations to be very risky, and the risk of being caught in the Netherlands not very high.


Plausible deniability

The presumed sloppiness is therefore no reason to lay back, but rather to be more alert. In hostile countries or high risk places, intelligence officers would make sure not to use and carry things that could to identify them or their mission so they can plausibly deny any accusations.

The cover story that the Russian foreign ministry came up with in this case is that there was nothing secret about trip of the four technical experts, as it was allegedly their job to test the cyber security of Russian diplomatic missions.


Prevention instead of monitoring

There were also some questions about how the Dutch services operated. Someone wondered for example why the MIVD didn't monitor the Russian hacking attempt for a short period of time in order to learn what kind of targets they were looking for - a common practice in cyber security.

During the press conference, MIVD director Eichelsheim said that the Russian equipment did not provide information about why the OPCW was targeted. We can assume that field operatives have no "need to know" for the actual purpose of the operation, which may also be classified differently. Maybe it was also already known that this particular GRU method is just used to get a general access to a network, instead of to particular users or files.

Another reason could be that the MIVD simply wanted to prevent any kind of attack on the network of an international organization like the OPCW - Dutch secret services can be quite strict when it comes to their legal tasks. This might have been different when the target had been a Dutch government agency, in which case it may be allowed to monitor a network intrusion for intelligence and prevention purposes.


Expelled instead of arrested

Another frequent question is why the Dutch authorities didn't arrest the GRU officers given the fact that they were caught red-handed. Instead, the four men had been immediately "escorted to a plane to Moscow" - not even formally expelled as some press reports suggest.

Here the most likely reason is that it's the usual practice in espionage to expel spies, especially when they operate under diplomatic cover. This not only prevents that a court case would attract public attention to intelligence failures and successes, but also that we can expect our own intelligence officials to be sent home instead of thrown in jail.



New strategy

A final question is why the MIVD came with such a unusually detailed presentation about a recent operation, given how extremely secretive the Dutch intelligence services are. But internationally there were precedents:

Last July, the US Department of Justice issued an indictment in which 12 Russian intelligence officials (mostly from the GRU) were identified and accused of hacking the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Clinton presidential campaign and subsequently releasing the stolen files using platforms like DC Leaks, Wikileaks and Guccifer 2.0.

In September, the British government also identified two GRU officers ("Alexander Petrov" and "Ruslan Boshirov") as the suspects in the case of the poisoning of former GRU officer and double agent Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in March 2018.

And just before the press conference in the Netherlands, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) came with a statement in which the GRU was accused of "indiscriminate and reckless cyber attacks" including disrupting the Kyiv metro, Odessa airport, Russia’s central bank and two Russian media outlets, hacking a small UK-based TV station and cyber attacks on Ukrainian financial, energy and government sectors.

This makes clear that "naming and shaming" Russian intelligence officials is a new deterrance strategy of the Western allies in the hybrid cyber and information war that Russia inflamed a few years ago.



Links and sources
- Clingendael.org: Hoe de Russen (waarschijnlijk) probeerden de OPCW te hacken
- Clingendael.org: Heads rolling at the GRU? Blundering Russian intelligence
- Spiegel.de: The Rise of Russia's GRU Military Intelligence Service
- Wired.com: How Russian Spies Infiltrated Hotel Wi-Fi to Hack Victims
- Emptywheel.net: A Tale of Two GRU Indictments
- RTLNieuws.nl: Waarom de MIVD de Russische spionnen niet liet vastzetten

Some older articles on this weblog that are of current interest:
In Dutch: Volg de actuele ontwikkelingen rond de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten via het Dossier herziening Wiv 2017